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 This case commentary provides an analysis of the judgment of 5 June 2015 in Lambert  
and others v. France, handed down by the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights. 
The case at issue concerned the discontinuation of treatment (artificial nutrition and hydration)  
of a patient who was unconscious and not able to express his wishes. It can undoubtedly  
be classified as one of the “hard cases” decided by the ECtHR, as it touches upon end-of-life 
dilemmas and the scope of patient’s autonomy. Legal regulation of these issues proves to be very 
difficult because it needs to avoid vagueness and has to balance conflicting interests and rights.  
 This comment proceeds as follows. Part I offers introductory remarks and explains the 
fundamental nature of the underlying dilemmas. Part II describes the basic facts of the case, 
followed by part III which describes the scope of the claim. Part IV discusses admissibility questions 
– that is – of locus standi and jurisdiction ratione personae. The next part provides some insight into 
the French legislation concerning the rights of patients in end-of-life situations (Loi Leonetti).  
Part VI discusses major questions that have been raised in the judgment. The final part offers  




persistent/obstinate therapy – medical futility – incompetent patients – informed consent – 
advanced directives – patient’s autonomy – right to life – State’s positive obligations 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 One of the consequences of the constant and rapid progress in 
medicine is the narrowing of the already thin line between sustaining life 
and prolonging the process of dying1. Many illnesses or injuries that some 
years ago would inevitably have lead to death, today are described  
as “incurable” and “chronic”. This phenomenon has coupled with another 
change – that is – evolution from paternalistic to patient-oriented medical 
care. During the last decades, patients’ right to take an active role in their 
own health care has increasingly been recognised2. But does this right 
extend to decisions as to how or when to die, or does it cover the right  
to refuse treatment? The problem becomes even more difficult when  
a person is incapable of active participation in health care decisions, 
because of a serious illness or injury. Even though many European 
countries have decided to regulate end-of-life issues3, the normative 
answers to these dilemmas are very diverse4. While only a few countries 
have legalised some forms of euthanasia or assisted suicide5, the others are 
increasingly recognising procedures for withholding/withdrawing persistent 
(obstinate) treatment in a situation of medical futility6. However, the 
                                                   
1  S. Paulson et al., Prolonging Life: Legal, Ethical, and Social Dilemmas, Annals of The New 
York Academy of Sciences 2014, no. 1, pp. 19-39; S. Woods, The “Good Death”, Palliative Care 
and End-of-Life Ethics, [in:] L. Hagger, S. Woods, A Good Death? Law and Ethics in Practice, 
Routledge 2012, available from: eBook Academic Collection (EBSCOhost).  
2  ECtHR in V.C. v. Slovakia, judgment of 8.11.2011, appl. no. 18968/07; ECtHR in Glass  
v. United Kingdom, judgment of 9.03.2004, appl. no. 61827/00; Report of the International 
Bioethics Committee of UNESCO on Consent, 2008, available at: http://unesdoc.unesco.org/ 
images/0017/001781/178124e.pdf [last accessed: 14.08.2016]; T. Beauchamp, R. Faden,  
A History and Theory of Informed Consent, New York 1979, pp. 53-140; E. Dantas, Autonomy, 
Consent and Informational Negligence: Origins and Perspectives, [in:] E. Sarnacka (ed.), Health 
Law. Selected Issues, Jastrzębie-Zdrój 2015, pp. 45-57; J. Munby, The Right to Demand Treatment 
or Death, [in:] Hagger, Woods, supra note 1. 
3  In Poland there is still no specific legislation regarding withdrawal of persistent 
therapy.  
4  I rely here on the information provided in the judgment under review, see para 72. 
However, this matter requires more comprehensive comparative research in the future.  
5  The Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Switzerland. 
6  The possibility of withdrawing treatment is either provided in the legislation  
(as in France), in non-binding instruments (such as codes of medical ethics – see i.a. British 
Medical Association, Withholding and Withdrawing Life-Prolonging Medical Treatment. Guidance 
for Decision Making, Oxford 2007) or recognised in the jurisprudence (as in Italy).  
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practice has proved that defining “persistent treatment” or “medical 
futility” and distinguishing them from passive euthanasia may be very 
difficult and controversial. Awareness of this delicate subject is also raised 
by means of terminological modifications – for example “Do Not 
Resuscitate” orders were further differentiated by adding the word attempt 
(“Do Not Attempt Resuscitation”) or replaced by the term “Allow Natural 
Death”7. 
 These and similar dilemmas are illustrated by a number of court cases 
reviewed by national courts8 and by the European Court of Human Rights 
(hereinafter as ECtHR)9. With the publicity surrounding these “high-
profile” cases, end-of-life matters are almost permanently an issue of public 
debate. These questions are not new in an academic and ethical debate. 
Nevertheless, their importance has not faded. Apart from the debatable 
merits, the case represented a precedent with respect to admissibility 
linked to the victim’s status and locus standi.  
 In this case-review one of such “high-profile” cases will be discussed. 
The judgment on the case was released by the Grand Chamber of the 
ECtHR on June 5 2015. Apart from analysing the judgment itself, I intend  
                                                   
7  S. Venneman, P. Narnor-Harris, M. Perish, M. Hamilton, “Allow Natural Death” Versus 
“Do Not Resuscitate”: Three Words That Can Change a Life, Journal of Medical Ethics 2008,  
vol. 34, pp. 2-6. 
8  In Ireland, Re a Ward of Court (No. 2) case established that a competent individual’s 
ability to control his/her treatment and care also extends to the right to refuse treatment  
to facilitate a natural death (judgment of the High Court of 5.05.1995; judgment  
of the Supreme Court of 27.06.1995). Similarily, the Italian Court of Cassation determined 
that informed consent includes the right to refuse medical care (Court of Cassation  
judgment of 16.10.2007, no. 21748 – as commented on in: G. Gentili, T. Groppi, Italian 
Constitutional and Cassation Courts: When the Right to Die of an Unconscious Patient  
Raises Serious Constitutional Conflicts Between State Powers, ILSA Journal of International  
and Comparative Law 2001, vol. 18, p. 75 et seq. With respect to the United Kingdom  
see judgments in Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland [1993] 789 HL; R(Burke) v. General Medical 
Council [2005] EWCA Civ., [2006] QB and W v. M and others [2011] EWHC 2443 (Fam).  
With respect to Canada see Supreme Court of Canada judgment in Cuthbertson v. Rasouli, 
2013 SCC 53, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 341. Regarding the USA see the widely-discussed case of Terri 
Chiavo – commented on i.a. by L.O. Gostin, Ethics, the Constitution, and the Dying Process.  
The Case of Theresa Marie Chiavo, Journal of the American Medical Association 2005, vol. 293, 
no. 19, pp. 2403-2407. 
9  Cases concerning capable patients that requested euthanasia/assisted suicide: Pretty  
v. United Kingdom, judgment of 29.04.2002, app. no. 2346/02; Haas v. Switzerland, judgment  
of 20.01.2011, appl. no. 31322/07; Koch v. Germany, judgment of 19.07.2012, appl. no. 497/09; 
Gross v. Switzerland, judgment of 14.05.2013, appl. no. 67810/10. 
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to give some more insight into the French Loi Leonetti that provides for  
a possibility of discontinuation of an obstinate and futile therapy. I will also 
include some basic comparative perspective, however a comprehensive 
and detailed comparative research would be welcomed in the future.  
 
II. FACTS OF THE CASE10  
 
 Vincent Lambert sustained serious head injuries in a road-traffic 
accident on 29 September 2008, which left him tetraplegic and in a state  
of complete dependency. From September 2008 to March 2009 he was 
hospitalised in Châlons-en-Champagne Hospital. From March to June 2009 
he was cared for in the heliotherapy centre in Berck-sur-Mer, before being 
moved on 23 June 2009 to the unit in Reims University Hospital providing 
care to patients in a vegetative or minimally conscious state, where he 
remained until the date of the judgment. Vincent Lambert received 
artificial nutrition and hydration which was administered enterally, through 
a gastric tube. In 2011 his condition was characterised as minimally 
conscious and in 2014 as vegetative.  
 In early 2013 the medical team initiated the collective procedure 
provided for by the Act of 22 April 2005 on patients’ rights and end-of-life 
issues (known as the Leonetti Act). Rachel Lambert, the patient’s wife, was 
involved in the procedure, which resulted in a decision by Dr Kariger, the 
doctor in charge of Vincent Lambert and head of the department in which 
he was hospitalised, to withdraw the patient’s nutrition and reduce his 
hydration. 
 In September 2013 a fresh collective procedure was initiated.  
Dr Kariger consulted six doctors, including three from outside the hospital. 
He also convened two meetings with the family, on 27 September and  
16 November 2013, following which Rachel Lambert and six of Vincent 
Lambert’s eight brothers and sisters argued in favour of discontinuing 
artificial nutrition and hydration, while the applicants argued in favour  
of maintaining it. On 9 December 2013 Dr Kariger called a meeting of all 
the doctors and almost all the members of the care team. He and five of the 
six doctors consulted stated that they were in favour of withdrawing 
                                                   
10  Facts of the case summarised on the basis of the press release available on HUDOC. 
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treatment. On conclusion of the consultation procedure Dr Kariger 
announced on 11 January 2014 in a decision, stating reasons – a summary 
of which was read out to the family – his intention to discontinue artificial 
nutrition and hydration from 13 January 2014, subject to an application  
to the administrative court. 
 Conseil d’État delivered its ruling on the case on 24 June 2014.  
It concluded that all the conditions imposed by the law had been met and 
that the doctor’s decision of 11 January 2014 to withdraw the artificial 
nutrition and hydration of Mr Vincent Lambert could not be held to be 
unlawful. 
 
III. SCOPE OF CLAIM 
 
 An application against France was lodged by Vincent Lambert’s 
parents, a half-brother and a sister. The applicants submitted that the 
withdrawal of Vincent Lambert’s artificial nutrition and hydration would 
be in breach of the State’s obligations under Article 2 (Right to life)  
of the Convention, would constitute ill-treatment amounting to torture 
within the meaning of Article 3 and would infringe his physical integrity, 
in breach of Article 8 of the Convention. They further alleged that the lack 
of physiotherapy since October 2012 and the lack of therapy to restore  
the swallowing reflex amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment  
in breach of Article 3 of the Convention.  
 
IV. LOCUS STANDI AND JURISDICTION RATIONE PERSONAE 
 
 Before discussing the merits of the case, the Court reflected upon  
the applicants’ standing to act in the name and on behalf of Vincent 
Lambert. This admissibility issue has also been a precedent, since never 
before had the Court had the opportunity to consider comparable 
circumstances.  
 Article 34 ECHR provides for a mechanism whereby an individual 
application may be lodged by “(...) any person, nongovernmental 
organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation 
of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols”. The concept 
(notion) of a victim has autonomous meaning and has been interpreted  
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in an evaluative manner and in the pro homine spirit. Thus, it does not only 
refer to a direct victim, but also to an indirect victim and a potential 
victim11.  
 The application at issue was lodged by four relatives of Vincent 
Lambert in his name and on his behalf. There is no doubt that Mr Lambert 
could be classified (regarded) as a direct victim of alleged violations, 
because he was “directly affected” by the measures and actions complained 
of. There was however a fundamental problem, because as a consequence 
of his physical state, he was unable to file the application himself. 
Moreover, it was unclear if he would wish to do so. 
 As a matter of principle, where the application is not lodged by the 
victim himself/herself, Rule 45 § 3 of the Rules of Court requires a written 
and duly signed authority to act. It is essential for the representatives  
to demonstrate that they have received specific and explicit instructions 
from the alleged victim on whose behalf they purport to act before  
the Court12. Only exceptionally, applications lodged by individuals  
on behalf of the victim (or victims) without a valid form of authority, were 
deemed admissible13.  
 The circumstances of the present case were very specific owing  
to the fact that while the direct victim was unable to express his wishes, 
several members of his close family wished to express themselves on his 
behalf, presenting diametrically opposed points of view14. Four applicants 
(Vincent Lambert’s parents, a half-brother, and a sister) argued that 
withdrawal of Vincent Lambert’s artificial nutrition and hydration would 
                                                   
11  Council of Europe, Department of the Jurisconsult, A Practical Guide on the Admissibility 
Criteria, Strasbourg 2014, pp. 14-16; P. van Dijk, G.J.H. Hoof, Theory and Practice  
of the European Convention on Human Rights, The Hague 1998, pp. 46-58; A. Mowbray, Cases, 
Materials, and Commentary on the European Convention on Human Rights, Oxford 2012,  
pp. 30-32; W.A. Schabas, European Convention on Human Rights: A Commentary, Oxford 2015, 
pp. 737-746. 
12  Lambert judgment, para 91 and case-law cited thereto. 
13  In the majority of cases, the application was lodged by a close relative and the direct 
victim was either dead or missing. Only a few were lodged by other persons or entities – i.a. 
a solicitor acting in the interest of children or an NGO or the husband of a woman who has 
been in a vulnerable position because she underwent a forced gynaecological examination  
in Police custody (Y.F. v. Turkey, judgment of 22.07.2003, appl. no. 24209/94). For more 
details see the Lambert judgment, paras 92-95 and Council of Europe, Department of the 
Jurisconsult, supra note 11, p. 18. 
14  Lambert judgment, para 98. 
163   |   European Court of Human Rights (GC), Case of Lambert and Others v. France… 
breach his Conventional rights (in particular the right to life and freedom 
from torture, inhuman and degrading treatment), whereas the individual 
third-party interveners (his wife, nephew and half-sister) claimed that 
continuation of treatment would be contrary to his previously expressed 
wishes, and as a consequence amount to a violation of the right to private 
life. For the first time, the Court had to deal with such divergence among 
the family members. The fundamental question was whether the applicants 
would in fact represent the victim’s wishes and best interests. To this 
purpose the Court relied on criteria, established in previous case-law,  
that had to be fulfilled when assessing the locus standi of a third party:  
(1) the risk that the direct victim will be deprived of effective protection  
of his or her rights, and (2) the absence of a conflict of interests between  
the victim and the applicant15. As regards the second criterion, the facts  
of the case, as well as the submissions of interveners, revealed a degree  
of uncertainty as to the correspondence of interests. The first criterion was 
in my opinion more difficult to assess, because it would be unacceptable  
to “close the door to the ECHR” for the victim because the first criterion  
has not been met. The only possibility (way out) in this situation was  
to judge the part of the application that could be filed by the applicants  
on their own behalf. These considerations led the Court to the conclusion 
that the applicants did not have standing to raise the complaints under  
Articles 2, 3 and 8 of the Convention in the name and on behalf of Vincent 
Lambert16.  
 The final outcome of the assessment of admissibility ratione personae 
was that the Court decided to examine the case under Article 2 of the 
Convention, as the applicants could raise their claim also on their own 
behalf. To sum up, the applicants were no longer acting on behalf  
of Vincent Lambert, but in their own name as indirect victims. This status 
could be given to applicants to whom the violation (of the rights of the 
direct victim) would cause harm or who would have a valid and personal 
interest in seeing it brought to an end17. So far this concept has been limited 
to situations when a direct victim has died or disappeared. In such  
                                                   
15  Ibidem, para 102. 
16  Ibidem, para 105. 
17  See i.a. Vallianatos and Others v. Greece [GC], judgment of 7.11.2013, appl. nos 29381/09 
32684/09, para 47. 
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cases, the victim’s next-of-kin18 could have a legal interest in raising  
a complaint19. In my opinion, the solution the Court has opted for has  
not been clearly and convincingly reasoned. Granting the applicants  
the status of indirect victims implies that their interest is similar and not  
in conflict with the rights and interests of Mr Lambert. The applicants’ 
submission that the withdrawal of Vincent Lambert’s artificial nutrition 
and hydration would be in breach of the State’s obligations under Article 2 
of the Convention20 is based on an assumption that the measures would  
be against his will, which could not have been established with certainty.  
 To close the remarks devoted to admissibility, I would like to raise  
the following question. Would it not be more logical for the applicants  
to rely on Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention and lodge the claim as direct 
victims of violations of these rights? The applicants could have argued that 
the lack of clarity and precision of the 2005 Act and the procedure that has 
been followed caused them mental suffering amounting to degrading  
or even inhuman treatment and also violated their right to family life. 
 
V. LOI LEONETTI OF 2005 – RATIO LEGIS, INTERPRETATION  
AND SUBSEQUENT AMENDMENTS 
 
 The Act on patients’ rights and end-of-life issues (so-called Loi 
Leonetti21) was adopted on 22 April 2005 (Loi relative aux droits des patients en 
fin de vie)22. Its objective (aim) was to prevent euthanatic practices  
and assisted suicide and to allow doctors to discontinue treatment  
(in accordance with a prescribed procedure) only if continuing it would 
demonstrate unreasonable obstinacy. As explained in the Rapport 
presented by Mr Leonetti at the Assemblée Nationale before the discussion 
on its final text, two reasons convinced the drafters of the necessity  
                                                   
18  See more about the concept of a “direct relative” and the evolution of the case-law  
in: Schabas, supra note 11, p. 739. 
19  In the majority of applications a violation of Article 2, Article 3 or Article 5 had been 
invoked.  
20  Lambert judgment, para 113. 
21  The Act was passed following the work of a parliamentary commission chaired by  
Mr Leonetti.  
22  http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr [last accessed: 17.06.2016]. 
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of legislating on the certain questions concerning end-of-life23 – “Le premier 
impératif est de respecter la dignité du patient, en tenant compte de sa volonté, 
lorsqu’il est en état de l’exprimer, en l’accompagnant par des soins palliatifs  
et psychologiques dont le développement doit être encouragé. Le deuxième impératif 
consiste à conférer un ancrage législatif aux conditions de limitation ou d’arrêt  
de traitement, qui n’ont été encadrées jusqu’à présent que par les bonnes pratiques 
de sociétés savantes telles celles des médecins réanimateurs qui arrêtent chaque 
année entre 75 000 et 100 000 appareils de réanimation. A cet effet, il convient 
d’éviter de laisser le juge arbitrer le flou juridique entourant la définition des droits 
des malades et des obligations professionnelles des médecins, sachant qu’un 
contentieux de plus en plus abondant pèse sur l’exercice de la profession médicale 
et sur son attractivité”.  
 The Act of 22 April 2005 amended several provisions of the Public 
Health Code (Code de la Santé Publique). Its Article L. 1110-5 refers  
to a concept of “unreasonable obstinacy” (fr. obstination déreaisonnable)24. 
According to this provision they could be defined as preventive  
or exploratory acts that “appear to be futile or disproportionate or to have 
no other effect than to sustain life artificially”. Such acts may be 
discontinued or withheld. 
 Article L. 1111-4 provided for the right of a patient to self-
determination and to free and informed consent. It provides that  
the patient, together with a health care professional shall take decisions 
concerning his or her health. It further regulates the situation of persons 
who are unable to express their wishes. It provides that “no intervention  
or examination may be carried out, except in cases of urgency or 
impossibility, without the person of trust (…) or the family or, failing this,  
a person close to the patient having been consulted”. The article also 
                                                   
23  Rapport de l’Assemblée Nationale n° 1929 fait ou nom de la Commission Spéciale chargée 
d’examiner la proposition de loi (no 1882) de M. Jean Leonetti et plusieurs de ses collègues relative  
aux drotis de malades et à la fin de vie, 18.11.2004, pp. 5-6. 
24  Article L. 1110-5 – “Toute personne a, compte tenu de son état de santé et de l’urgence  
des interventions que celui-ci requiert, le droit de recevoir les soins les plus appropriés et de bénéficier 
des thérapeutiques dont l’efficacité est reconnue et qui garantissent la meilleure sécurité sanitaire  
au regard des connaissances médicales avérées. Les actes de prévention, d’investigation ou de soins  
ne doivent pas, en l’état des connaissances médicales, lui faire courir de risques disproportionnés  
par rapport au bénéfice escompté. Ces actes ne doivent pas être poursuivis par une obstination 
déreaisonnable. Lorsqu’ils apparaissent inutiles, disproportionnés, inutiles ou n’ayant d’autre effet  
que le seul maintien artificiel de la vie, ils peuvent être suspendus ou ne pas être entrepris”. 
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provides for some procedural requirements in a situation where a decision 
to limit or withdraw treatment would endanger the patient’s life. Such  
a decision cannot be taken without a collective procedure defined in the 
Code of Medical Ethics having been followed and without the person  
of trust referred to in Article L. 1111-6 or the family or, failing this, a person 
close to the patient having been consulted, and without any advance 
directives issued by the patient having been examined25.  
 Almost from its adoption, the 2005 Act has been the subject of debates, 
but the case of Mr Lambert has undoubtedly triggered the most serious 
questions. In December 2012 a Report of the Commission de réflexion sur la fin 
de vie was presented to the President of the Republic26. The Report did not 
recommend changes to Loi Leonetti; nevertheless it pointed out deficiencies 
in applying the existing law and in medical practice. 
 In July 2013 an important opinion n° 121 entitled “Fin de vie, autonomie 
de la personne, volonté de mourir” was presented by the CCNE27.  
The Committee highlighted the necessity to eliminate situations when 
human dignity is not respected during the process of dying. It observed, 
that to this end, it is indispensable to provide wide access to palliative care 
and palliative drugs, also for in-house use. Another point was raised 
concerning relations between the patient, the doctor, and the family.  
The Committee insisted on the necessity to respect advanced directives 
when the patient made use of this possibility. Moreover, when an advance 
directive has been drafted in the presence of the treating doctor, and  
a serious illness (fr. maladie grave) has been diagnosed, the CCNE suggested 
that it should as a principle (subject to duly reasoned exceptions)  
be binding on the caregivers. Finally, the opinion firmly stated that medical 
staff should respect the right of the patient at the end-of-life to deep 
sedation (fr. sédation profonde) until the decease, if the patient has  
                                                   
25  “Lorsque la personne est hors d’état d’exprimer sa volonté, la limitation ou l’arrêt de traitement 
susceptible de mettre sa vie en danger ne peut être réalisé sans avoir respecté la procédure  
collégiale définie par le code de déontologie médicale et sans que la personne de confiance prévue  
à l’article L. 1111-6 ou la famille ou, à défaut, un de ses proches et, le cas échéant, les directives 
anticipées de la personne, aient été consultés”. 
26  http://www.elysee.fr/assets/pdf/Rapport-de-la-commission-de-reflexion-sur-la-fin-de 
-vie-en-France.pdf [last accessed: 17.06.2016]. 
27  http://www.ccne-ethique.fr/sites/default/files/publications/avis_121_0.pdf [last accessed: 
18.06.2016]. 
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so requested. Similarly, the patient’s will to withdraw all treatment, 
including nutrition and hydration, should be respected. All this should  
be seen as a form of assistance in the realisation of the right to die  
in dignity and without suffering. From the point of view of human rights 
law and ongoing debates concerning the concept of the “right to die  
in dignity”, it is important to note that the Committee clearly limited  
the scope of this right to situations when death is close and inevitable.  
In other words, it would not apply to even seriously ill patients if they are 
not in a terminal phase.  
 As is usually the case with legal provisions, the devil is in the details. 
Even though the ratio legis of Loi Leonetti has been rather clearly articulated, 
certain notions and concepts turned out difficult to interpret and define. 
Domestic courts that have been reviewing the case of Mr Lambert have  
had opposing views as to the interpretation of “unreasonable obstinacy” 
and when a treatment is to be regarded as “futile or disproportionate”.  
The Administrative Court in its judgment of 16 January 2014 stated that  
as long as the treatment did not cause any stress or suffering, it could  
not be characterised as futile or disproportionate28. The Conseil d’État’s 
standpoint and interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Public 
Health Code was however different: “(…) the legislature intended  
to include among the forms of treatment that may be limited or withdrawn 
on the grounds of unreasonable obstinacy all acts which seek to maintain 
the patient’s vital functions artificially. Artificial nutrition and hydration 
fall into this category of acts (...)”29. 
 Ten years after the adoption of the Loi Leonetti, a new law on the rights 
of persons at the end-of-life has been approved by Parliament, and entered 
into force on August 5 201630. The Loi Claeys-Leonetti31 proclaims a right  
                                                   
28  Lambert judgment, para 19. 
29  Ibidem, para 24. 
30 http://www.gouvernement.fr/argumentaire/les-nouveaux-droits-des-personnes-en-
fin-de-vie-pleinement-effectifs [last accessed: 29.07.2016]. 
31  Loi n° 2016-87 du 2.02.2016 créant de nouveaux droits en faveur des malades et des personnes 
en fin de vie, JORF no. 0028 of 3.02.2016.  
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to demand deep sedation until decease, under certain conditions prescribed 
in detail by regulatory (executive) acts32. 
 
VI. THE RIGHT TO LIFE, THE PATIENT’S SELF-DETERMINATION  
AND THE DISCONTINUATION OF PERSISTENT (OBSTINATE) THERAPY 
 
 The merits of the case at issue were concentrated on Article 2  
of the Convention and State’s positive obligations to take appropriate steps 
to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction. Both parties to the 
case, as well as the Court, were in agreement that there should be  
a distinction between the intentional taking of life and “therapeutic 
abstention”33. While the first situation would engage negative obligations, 
the other related to positive ones. 
 In the applicants’ view, the French legislation at issue was vague and 
open to divergent interpretations. They argued in particular that the notion 
of unreasonable obstinacy, as well as the criterion concerning treatment 
having “no other effect than to sustain life artificially”, was extremely 
imprecise. They also disagreed with the classification of artificial nutrition 
and hydration as treatment rather than care. In their opinion Vincent 
Lambert was not at the end of life and the notion of unreasonable obstinacy 
did not apply to his medical situation34. 
 
 6.1. MARGIN OF APPRECIATION AND EUROPEAN CONSENSUS 
 
 One of the major points raised in the judgment was the concept  
of margin of appreciation, which is by far one of the most widely discussed 
and controversial issues concerning the ECtHR judicial practice35.  
                                                   
32  The first regulation sets out conditions for the withdrawal of all treatments followed  
by a deep sedation. The second regulation circumscribes the criteria and validity of advanced 
directives. 
33  Lambert judgment, para 124. 
34  Ibidem, para 125. 
35  See i.a. S. Greer, The Margin of Appreciation: Interpretation and Discretion Under  
the European Convention on Human Rights, Council of Europe 2000; Y. Arai-Takahashi,  
The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of Proportionality in the Jurisprudence  
of the ECHR, Antwerp 2002; A. Wiśniewski, Koncepcja marginesu swobody oceny w orzecznictwie 
Europejskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka [Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the European Court  
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 The Court recalled that, in the context of the State’s positive 
obligations, when addressing complex scientific, legal, and ethical issues 
concerning in particular the beginning or the end of life, and in the absence 
of consensus among the Member States, a certain margin of appreciation 
has been recognised36.  
 When analysing the margin of appreciation, comparative data  
are indispensable for establishing a consensus (or its absence) among  
the Council of Europe Member States. Comparative analysis has led the 
Court to the conclusion that although the majority of States allow for  
the withdrawal of artificial life-sustaining treatment, there appears to be  
no consensus as to the detailed conditions and the procedure for 
withdrawal37. When lack of consensus is identified, States are offered  
(in principle) a wider margin of appreciation.  
 
 6.2. CONDITIONS FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF THERAPY – GENERAL REMARKS 
 
 The primary condition for both starting and withdrawing any kind  
of treatment (or any kind of medical intervention) is the patient’s consent. 
There is no doubt that the principle of free and informed consent is today 
of paramount importance38. Thus, a capable patient may decide to stop  
or not to start a treatment, even if this decision would not prolong his/her 
life. With incompetent patients, as in the case of Vincent Lambert,  
a fundamental problem lies within a procedure and the persons 
empowered to take such decision. In the absence of an advance directive 
(that is regulated in some countries), the decision lies with a third party, 
                                                                                                                           
of Human Rights Jurisprudence], Gdańsk 2008; A. Legg, The Margin of Appreciation  
in International Human Rights Law: Deference and Proportionality, Oxford 2012; S. Matthew,  
The European Court of Human Rights Margin of Appreciation and the Processes of National 
Parliaments, Human Rights Law Review 2015, vol. 15, no. 4, pp. 745-774; F. van Hoof,  
The Stubbornness of the European Court of Human Right’s Margin of Appreciation Doctrine ,  
[in:] Y. Haeck, B. McGonigle Leyh, C. Burbano-Herrera, D. Contreras-Garduño (eds),  
The Realisation of Human Rights: When Theory Meets Practice. Studies in Honour of Leo Zwaak , 
Cambridge/Antwerp/Portland 2014, pp. 125-149.  
36  Lambert judgment, para 144. 
37  Ibidem, para 147 and paras 72-76. The Court relied on the data from 39 of the 47 Council 
of Europe Member States. 
38  See Article 5 of the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine and Explanatory 
report to the convention. See also ECtHR judgment of 10.06.2010 in Jehovah’s Witnesses  
of Moscow v. Russia, appl. no. 302/02, GC, para 135. 
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usually a person’s relatives or a doctor. At this point, another problem  
may emerge, that is a disagreement between the doctors and the family,  
or between the members of a family. In this event, the law should provide 
for a procedure to solve the problem in a way that would not be contrary  
to the Convention. As has been mentioned above, States are offered  
a margin of appreciation when regulating this delicate matter.  
 Apart from the requirement to seek a valid consent, domestic laws  
(or jurisprudence) regulate and define the condition or state of health  
of a patient whose treatment could be withdrawn39. Domestic laws also 
vary in this respect. For example, the Italian Court of Cassation in the well-
known case of Eluana Englaro has established two conditions that have  
to be met in order to withdraw life support treatment: 1) no prospect for 
recovery – vegetative state is irreversible and incurable, 2) there is clear, 
unambiguous and convincing evidence that it would be consistent with  
the patient’s mind/will – which, as the Court has suggested – could  
be deduced from his/her personality, lifestyle, values, ethical, religious, 
and philosophical beliefs40.  
 At this point, the biggest challenge is, in my opinion, to identify which 
and whose rights should be taken into account in a “fair balance test”.  
In other words, should the patient’s right to life be given priority over their 
right to respect for their private life and their personal autonomy?41 What 
to do, when, as in Mr Lambert’s case, the patient’s wishes cannot  
be established with absolute certainty? Should the rights of the family 
members also be taken into account? And finally, what role should  
the concept of dignity play in the balancing process? 
 To sum up this part of the discussion I would like to address the last 
question. Even though the concept of human dignity is a meta-concept that 
                                                   
39  Lambert judgment, para 76. “The patient must be dying or suffering from a condition 
with serious and irreversible medical consequences, the treatment must no longer be in  
the patient’s best interests, it must be futile, or withdrawal must be preceded by an 
observation phase of sufficient duration and by a review of the patient’s condition”.  
40  Court of Cassation judgment of 16.10.2007, no. 21748 – as commented in: G. Gentili,  
T. Groppi, Italian Constitutional and Cassation Courts: When the Right to Die of an Unconscious 
Patient Raises Serious Constitutional Conflicts Between State Powers, ILSA Journal  
of International and Comparative Law 2001, vol. 18, pp. 75-76. 
41  Lambert judgment, para 148. 
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serves as the source of all human rights42, it somehow unexpectedly  
(or even paradoxically) is called upon to support the idea of individual 
autonomy and self-determination in the situation of a clash with one’s right 
to life. End-of-life decision-making cases definitely serve as an example  
of conceptual conundrums with relations between human dignity  
and individual rights that international and domestic courts have  
to struggle with. From the ECtHR jurisprudence it follows that even 
though the principle of the sanctity of life is protected under the 
Convention, the patient’s autonomy may prevail in certain circumstances 
because respect for human dignity and human freedom is “the very 
essence of the Convention”43. The Italian Court of Cassation in the Englaro 
case similarly stated, that the guardian and the court should balance  
the protection of the patient’s life with his/her conception of dignity and  
a decorous life44. 
 
 6.3. A QUESTION OF LAW – DID LOI LEONETTI APPROPRIATELY PROTECT THE RIGHT  
 TO LIFE?  
 
 A fundamental question raised in the Vincent Lambert case was 
whether the definitions of “unreasonable obstinacy” and “treatment” 
offered by the French courts were compatible with the State’s obligation  
to protect life. Could artificial nutrition and hydration be regarded  
as a “treatment” that may be withdrawn?  
 Unlike artificial ventilation, artificial nutrition and hydration raise 
different opinions, as to whether they are a form of treatment (that may  
be withdrawn) or form of basic care (which cannot be limited). Even  
the Committee on Bioethics (DH-BIO) of the Council of Europe in its 
“Guide on the decision-making process regarding medical treatment in 
end-of-life situations” (which was drafted with the intention of facilitating 
                                                   
42  P.G. Carozza, Human Dignity, [in:] D. Shelton (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of International 
Human Rights Law, Oxford 2015, pp. 345-359; E. Klein, Human Dignity: Basics of Human  
Right, [in:] H.P. Hestermeyer et al (ed.), Coexistence, Cooperation and Solidarity. Liber  
Amicorum Rüdiger Wolfrum, Leiden 2012, pp. 437-452; J. Habermas, The Concept of Human 
Dignity and the Realistic Utopia of Human Rights, [in:] C. Corradetti (ed.), Philosophical 
Dimensions of Human Rights: Some Contemporary Views, Dordrecht 2012, pp. 63-79. 
43  Pretty v. United Kingdom, judgment of 29.04.2002, app. no. 2346/02, para 65. 
44  Court of Cassation judgment, supra note 40, p. 75. 
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the implementation of the principles enshrined in the Convention  
on Human Rights and Biomedicine) has not taken any definitive position  
on that question45. In its judgment of 24 June 2014 the Conseil d’État stated 
that artificial nutrition and hydration fell into that category of treatments 
that could be withdrawn when the criteria for unreasonable obstinacy were 
met46. The ECtHR, when analysing the Conseil d’État judgment, rightly 
emphasised that the interpretation presented therein did not allow for  
an automatism in making decisions47. This has led the Court to the 
conclusion that the Loi Leonetti and its interpretation were sufficiently clear, 
for the purposes of Article 2 of the Convention.  
 
 6.4. A QUESTION OF PRACTICE – DID THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS REACH  
 A FAIR BALANCE? 
 
 This question addresses the applicants’ allegations that the decision-
making process had not been genuinely collective and did not provide  
for mediation in the event of disagreement between the family members. 
The Court’s analysis of this point seems incomplete. The Court 
concentrated on establishing whether the decision-making process 
followed the conditions set up by French law, and it rightly concluded, that 
it did48. Nevertheless, the Court did not really elaborate on the question  
of whether the law reached a fair balance in a situation of disagreement 
and when the patient’s wishes were not known for certain. The Court 
shielded itself by stating that Article 2 of the ECHR does not impose  
any requirements as to the procedure to be followed with a view to 
securing a possible agreement and that it falls within the State’s margin  
                                                   
45  Text available at: www.coe.int/en/web/bioethics/guide-on-the-decision-making-
process-regarding-medical-treatment-in-end-of-life-situations [last accessed: 2.08.2016]. 
46  Conseil d’État further elaborated that the doctor in charge of the patient must base his 
or her decision on a range of medical and non-medical factors – see Lambert judgment,  
para 48. 
47  Conseil d’État stated that “the sole fact that a person is in an irreversible state  
of unconsciousness or, a fortiori, has lost his or her autonomy irreversibly and is thus 
dependent on such a form of nutrition and hydration, does not by itself amount to a situation 
in which the continuation of treatment would appear unjustified on grounds of unreasonable 
obstinacy”. 
48  Ibidem, para 157. 
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of appreciation49. While all this is true, the Court is still empowered to 
appraise the measures and acts of State. In other words, the Court is not 
expected to “impose” or list any particular requirements, but to address  
the issue of fair balance, necessity, and proportionality. Thus, at this point  
it seems relevant to raise a question as to whether the lack of provisions 
that could resolve the problem of disagreement between the family 
members (either in the form of mediation or the order in which family 
member’s views should be taken into account) reached a fair balance. 
Another element of the judgment that is debatable is the statement that 
Vincent Lambert’s wishes could have been established on the basis  




 The commented judgment was definitely one of the “hard cases”  
of 2015. Therefore, in the conclusions I would like to concentrate on more 
general remarks, instead of on specific issues such as admissibility  
or the margin of appreciation.  
 The Lambert case illustrates a wider problem of contemporary societies 
in developed and ageing countries – that is – a problem of end-of-life 
decision-making and of an adequate standard of care of terminally ill 
patients or patients in a vegetative state. The decision-making process 
becomes far more complicated when a patient is unable to express his/her 
wishes and in the absence of an advance directive (AD). Some authors  
have already advocated the necessity of regulating AD’s and their 
popularisation relying on a legitimate assumption that advance directives 
serve to enhance the patient’s autonomy51. Even though there is still some 
controversy about the role, strengths, and shortcomings of advance health 
                                                   
49  Ibidem, para 153 and 159. 
50  Ibidem, para 171. See also some doubts raised by the dissenting judges in joint partly 
dissenting opinion, para 5. 
51  R. Andorno, N. Biller-Andorno, S. Brauer, Advance Health Care Directives: Towards  
a Coordinated European Policy?, European Journal of Health Law 2009, vol. 16, p. 208. 
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care decisions52, legal regulation is better than the chaos caused by the lack 
of statutory response53. The need for regulation has also been addressed  
in a Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 1859 (2012), 
“Protecting human rights and dignity by taking into account the previously 
expressed wishes of patients”, where the Parliamentary Assembly 
recommended that countries with no specific legislation on the matter – put 
into place a “road map” towards such legislation promoting advance 
directives, living wills and/or continuing powers of attorney, on the basis 
of the Oviedo Convention and Recommendation CM/Rec(2009)11. 
 A final remark would be devoted to the quality of law, the fair balance 
principle, and its relevance for the decision-making procedures. In the 
Lambert case, the ECtHR was satisfied with the clarity of the law and its 
interpretation made by the French courts. While I would generally concur 
with this conclusion, I see one missing element that the lawmakers  
(not only French ones) should take into account. Assuming that advance 
directives will probably not become a widespread practice soon, the law 
has to foresee mechanisms for resolving disagreement between  
the members of a family and/or family members and doctors. When 
deciding on the particularities of such mechanisms, it should  
be remembered that the procedures should primarily serve the best 
interests of the patient, but the rights of the families should not be 
forgotten. To achieve a truly fair balance, empirical research ought  
to be conducted and taken into account, to avoid making law that is based 
solely on ethical and legal theories54.  
 
                                                   
52  Ibidem, pp. 209-210. See also: R. Andorno, Regulation Advance Directives at the Council  
of Europe, [in:] S. Negri, Self-Determination, Dignity and End-of-Life Care: Regulating Advance 
Directives in International and Comparative Perspective, Leiden-Boston 2011, pp. 76-77. 
53  For example, in Germany until 1.09.2009 there was no statutory law on AD’s –  
as a consequence, judicial decisions were often inconsistent and unable to provide a precise 
guidance – see: U. Wiesing, R.J. Jox, H.J. Hessler, G.D. Borasio, A New Law on Advance 
Directives in Germany, Journal of Medical Ethics 2010, vol. 36(12), p. 779. 
54  As an example: C. Kitzinger, J. Kitzinger, Withdrawing Artificial Nutrition and Hydration 
From Minimally Conscious and Vegetative Patients: Family Perspectives , Journal of Medical  
Ethics 2015, vol. 41, pp. 157-160; C. Kitzinger, J. Kitzinger, Court Applications for Withdrawal  
of Artificial Nutrition and Hydration from Patients in a Permanent Vegetative State: Family 
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